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Essays on the Economics of Climate Change
Steffen Merte
Climate change is a major environmental threat and likely one of the most impor-
tant challenges of our time. In particular, climate extremes –such as heat waves– can
have a significant negative effect on society. Yet, many impacts of climate change are
poorly understood and binding international climate change agreements are notori-
ously hard to reach.
This work deals with the economics of climate change in three separate essays. The
first one introduces a new methodology to estimate the impacts of climate extremes
on public health. The second utilizes this methodology to assess the impacts of several
climate change scenarios on Europe. The third explores a way to increase cooperation
on climate change mitigation policies through explicit communication of the uncer-
tainty of future climate change impacts.
In general, human mortality shows an oscillatory pattern on top of a nonlinear trend.
It tends to be highest in winter and lowest in summer. The nonlinear trend follows
changes in health policies, economic growth rates, and other institutional factors. The
first essays shows that singular spectrum analysis can be used for the estimation of
this base rate mortality and thus allows to isolate the impacts of climate extremes
on human mortality. This methodology is an improvement over approaches based on
fixed effects or classic spectral analysis. It makes it possible to extend climate impact
analysis to regions and countries for which there are no detailed data from hospital
records as only coarse monthly data on mortality are needed.
The danger of climate change lies not necessarily in the shift in average temperatures,
but more so the increase in frequency of extreme heat events. Yet, while heat waves
become more common, cold spells become less frequent. As both types of extreme
temperature events increase human morbidity and mortality, the net effect of this
shift is unknown. The second essay finds that a scenario of moderate warming can
have a positive net effect on some European countries, creating winners and losers.
In contrast –severe warming as a result of failed climate change mitigation policies–
affects all examined European countries in a negative way. There would be no win-
ners, just losers.
As a result of the uncertainty associated with it, climate change poses a different chal-
lenge than other social dilemma situations: The negative effects of climate change do
not necessarily take place incrementally. While this should be a focal point for policy
makers, the costs of climate change tend to be presented within an expected utility
framework. Yet, the potential behavioral reactions to this uncertainty are –so far– nei-
ther explored nor accounted for in game-theoretic models of climate coalition building.
The third essay finds that cooperation in a public goods game can be increased when
the uncertainty is communicated explicitly. This means that uncertainty should not
be hidden behind expected costs and benefits, but rather be acknowledged when the
goal is to form a climate change mitigation agreement.
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Introduction
Climate change is frequently featured in the media. Be it because of the yearly nego-
tiations on international climate policy, because of a widespread draught, or because
the past year has –yet again– been the hottest in the history of temperature records.
The basic science behind climate change is taught in schools and universities, but we
still have not agreed on how to coordinate our efforts against it and how to limit the
potential damages.
Why is this the case? The underlying cause of climate change is well known —
our emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere leads the earth to heat up.
These emissions need to be reduced and eventually completely halted. The issue that
makes climate change such a tremendous challenge is that a unilateral reduction of
greenhouse gases is likely to have negative net impacts on the respective country. As
climate change mitigation policies must aim at internalizing the costs of greenhouse
gas emissions, companies in the respective countries face higher costs and are thus at
a comparative disadvantage. Benefits on the other hand are felt all around the world,
making climate change one enormous prisoner’s dilemma.
Besides the detrimental incentive structure when it comes to climate change mitiga-
tion, framing climate change as global warming further complicates things. While –on
average– the temperature is indeed rising, this portrayal oversimplifies the problem.
The change in temperature varies significantly across both geography and time. Cli-
mate change affects some countries more than others and there is be a high degree of
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variation in time. Further, even a minor shift in average temperature leads to a major
shift in extreme temperature events. Figure I-1 illustrates this issue using maximum
daily temperatures from Europe:
Figure I-1: Shift in Temperature Distribution in Europe. The dark probabil-
ity mass function shows the distribution of maximum daily temperatures in Europe
during 2001 to 2010, while the light probability mass function shows the distribution
of the 1951 – 1980 reference climatology.
For the reference period from 1951 to 1980, the average daily maximum tempera-
ture in Europe was 12.73◦C. In the last century, from 2001 to 2010, the average daily
maximum temperature was 14.38◦C, meaning that the temperature increase was only
1.65◦C on average. Yet, by 2001 to 2010, the hottest events –defined as the hottest
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1% of the reference period, had already multiplied in frequency by 8.6 times. As it is
temperature extremes –not the average temperature– that cause most damage, the
political focus should be shifted accordingly.
On top of this, the complex nature of the climate system adds further complications
and can result in sudden, highly nonlinear changes. It is possible that there are several
–currently unknown– thresholds for the atmospheric level of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. Upon reaching these, there is the possibility of a sudden shift in
climate-sensitive environmental systems that far exceed the rather slow and gradual
change that is currently observed. There is a great deal of uncertainty about sudden
shifts and the future impacts if climate change in general, making it very difficult to
properly assess the optimal degree of climate change mitigation. To simplify decision-
making for policy makers, the likelihood and damage of the various effects of different
climate change scenarios are aggregated into a single number, expected costs. While
this approach does make the comparison of different scenarios easier, it masks com-
plexity and provides the illusion of certainty. As a result, it is also undermining the
precautionary principle and supports the widespread belief in the possibility to adapt
to climate change. This technocratic view –and ultimately ”arrogant faith” (Gore,
2013, p. 240)– might lead to inaction and subsequently to higher damages due to
climate change.
This work deals with several of the above-mentioned aspects of the economics of cli-
mate change. The first essay introduces a new methodology to estimate the effects
of extreme temperature events. The second essay deals with the future impacts of
temperature extremes as well as with the associated uncertainty under different cli-
mate change scenarios. The third essay explores a way to make international climate
cooperation more likely through communicating said uncertainty.
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time: Countries need to coop-
3
erate now and reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in order to be able to prevent
most damage. Creating a stable and effective international climate policy regime is
not an easy task, but a necessary one. Many small additional pieces of knowledge are




Climate Change Impact Estimation Using Singular
Spectrum Analysis
Heat waves are a threat to society in many ways and are becoming increasingly
frequent. Hence estimating their impact is key when it comes to the design of effective
climate change adaptation measures.
Here I present and explore a new methodology –based singular spectrum analysis– to
do so. Using data from 27 European countries, I derive excess estimates for mortality
in three different temporal resolutions. Excess estimates are then regressed against a
heat wave measure in order to assess the impacts of extreme heat.
The results show that singular spectrum analysis has analytical advantages over an
approach using fixed effects or standard spectral analysis. Monthly-level mortality
rates are sufficient to gain meaningful estimates for the impact on heat waves on
mortality.
This finding demonstrates that singular spectrum analysis can be a powerful tool
to understand the impacts of climate change. It complements existing methodologies




Climate change is a considerable environmental threat (Watts et al., 2015), affecting
society in several different ways. Among these, heat waves possibly pose the highest
risk to public health (IPCC, 2014b). Episodes of high temperatures increase both
human morbidity (Semenza, McCullough, Flanders, McGeehin, and Lumpkin, 1999)
and mortality (Semenza et al., 1996), particularly among the elderly and those with
pre-existing medical conditions (Kovats and Hajat, 2008). They further have an averse
effect on crop yields (Schlenker and Roberts, 2006, 2009) and might negatively impact
the economy.
As a result of climate change, events of extreme heat have become more frequent
in recent years (Hansen, Sato, and Ruedy, 2012). A further increase in frequency is
projected for the future (Fischer and Knutti, 2015). This means that high-impact
events will become more common and will no longer be an exception.
The impact of heat waves on human mortality has been studied extensively using case
studies. Some authors focus on particular cities (see e.g. Marmor, 1975; Changnon,
Kunkel, and Reinke, 1996; F. Ballester, Corella, Pe´rez-Hoyos, Sa´ez, and Herva`s, 1997;
Whitman et al., 1997; Vandentorren et al., 2004; Anderson and Bell, 2009; Madrig-
ano, Ito, Johnson, Kinney, and Matte, 2015), while others examine slightly broader
geographic areas (see e.g. Huynen, Martens, Schram, Weijenberg, and Kunst, 2001;
Fouillet et al., 2006; Barreca, Clay, Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro, 2016). Com-
mon to both is the use of micro-level health data, usually taken from daily hospital
records. While this approach allows to look at the causes of death, it is only feasible
if the needed detailed data are available. It is because of this limitation that a differ-
ent approach is needed: This work tries to do so. It estimates the effects of extreme
heat events without relying on health data from hospitals. As a result, the geographic
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scope of the analysis can be extended. Countries, for which data from hospitals do not
exist or are costly to acquire, can be included, as can minor heat waves. This helps
gaining a more conclusive picture of the effect of heat waves on human mortality.
1.2 Methodology
This work examines the impact of heat waves on Europe in a two-step process. First,
base rate mortality is derived by applying a method of time series decomposition on
country-level mortality rates. Second, the excess estimates are regressed against a
heat wave measure in order to quantify the effects of extreme heats events.
Heat waves tend to be limited to a few days at a time. They occur at irregular intervals
and not usually every year at the same time. It is because of this, that excess mortality
due to heat waves is not correlated with base rate mortality. The effect of heat waves
is superimposed on the other factors affected mortality. As a result, it is possible to
differentiate the effects of heat waves from the other causes of human mortality.
Mortality Rates and Excess Mortality
In general, mortality rates show a seasonal fluctuation. The number of deaths is
highest in winter and lowest in summer. Although periodic, these fluctuations are
not necessarily harmonic and can be subject to modulations in amplitude. On top of
this, mortality rates show a distinct pattern for each country: They are affected by
many factors such as level of economic development, availability of medical services,
societal norms, and prevalence of endogenous diseases. Combined, these factors in-
fluence and change base rate mortality slowly in a nonlinear fashion. As a result, the
base rate mortality can be subject to change over time. If, by way of example, a coun-
try experiences a shift in unemployment rates, its mortality rates can be expected to
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change as well (Stuckler, Basu, Suhrcke, Coutts, and McKee, 2009). This, together
with other factors such as changes in national health care expenditures (Kennelly,
O’Shea, and Garvey, 2003), leads to a nonlinear trend in base rate mortality that
is not related to variations in extreme temperature events or in other environmental
factors.
When causes of mortality are analyzed, different types of health data on different
temporal scales are utilized.
Cause-specific mortality data provide information on the underlying and contributing
causes of death. Further information about the deceased such as day of death or per-
sonal details can be included as well, depending on the source of the data. With this
data, there can be a privacy concern if causes of death can be attributed to individu-
als, such as when obtained from a hospital. This is not the case if the cause-of-death
statistics are accumulated by type.
All-cause mortality data do not differentiate between the individual causes of death.
Given the lack of privacy concerns in case of low geographic resolution, this type of
data is usually most readily available. Different national and international statistical
offices such as the National Center for Health Statistics or Eurostat provide all-cause
mortality data for large geographic areas.
In this work, all cause mortality data are used. Data that includes the cause of death
are not publicly obtainable for a significant part of the intended study area. Further,
given distinct national policies, data received from different countries would need to
be standardized first in order to be comparable. This introduces an additional level of
uncertainty. Finally –and most importantly– for large areas of the world, no reliable
cause-of-death statistics exist. Even when a country reports these data, it might not
be reliable (Burger et al., 2012). Changes in the reporting of the underlying cause
of death can introduce biases (Helweg-Larsen, 2011). As a consequence, there is a
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need for analysis methods that use all-cause mortality data of low resolution until
sufficiently reliable cause-of-death data are available universally. The methodology
used in this work is thus not intended to replace established approaches, but rather
to complement them and to extend the analysis.
Impacts of Heat Waves on Public Health
Climate change has both direct and indirect effects, interacting with socio-economic
factors, forming health risks for society (Watts et al., 2015). In general, mortality rates
have a U-shaped relation with temperature; both extreme cold and extreme heat are
increasing mortality rates (F. Ballester et al., 1997). The effects of climate change
include increased thermal stress, increased risk of flood, and increased prevalence of
certain infectious diseases (McMichael, Woodruff, and Hales, 2006). Heat waves –due
to their short-lived nature– affect public health primarily directly. The longer and
more intense a heat wave, the more severe its impact (Anderson and Bell, 2011).
Generally speaking, episodes of high temperatures can lead to overheating of the
body. Several related conditions can be differentiated (see Bouchama and Knochel,
2002): Mere discomfort, as a result of a fairly small elevation in body temperature
(Epstein and Moran, 2006), is referred to as heat stress. Heat exhaustion is a state
characterized by dehydration and electrolyte loss as well as, possibly but not neces-
sarily, slightly elevated temperature. Left untreated, heat exhaustion can progress to
heat stroke (Luber and McGeehin, 2008), which is a critical condition with signifi-
cantly increased body temperature. Heat stroke severely affects the nervous system
and can possibly lead to coma and death (Luber and McGeehin, 2008). Accordingly,
during episodes of high temperatures, hospitals see an increased influx of patients
due to dehydration, heat exhaustion, as well as heat stroke (Semenza et al., 1999),
some of which die (Fouillet et al., 2006).
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There is evidence that vulnerability towards heat waves differs across individuals and
communities. Women and the elderly are most affected (e.g. Fouillet et al., 2006;
Robine et al., 2008), as the body’s thermoregulative capability –especially in women
after the menopause– declines with age (Hajat, Kovats, and Lachowycz, 2007). There
are also pre-natal impacts. Episodes of high temperatures during the second and third
trimester of a pregnancy can have a negative impact on birth weight (Deschenes,
Greenstone, and Guryan, 2009), though the exact mechanism of action is currently
still unknown.
Further, people with pre-existing conditions experience more severe effects (e.g. Se-
menza et al., 1996, 1999), mainly as a result of the heat compounding the effects of
the pre-existing conditions (Keatinge and Donaldson, 2004). One of the conditions
in question are cardiovascular diseases (F. Ballester et al., 1997; Huynen et al., 2001;
Patz, Campbell-Lendrum, Holloway, and Foley, 2005; Fouillet et al., 2006; Madrigano
et al., 2015), that are prevalent in large parts of society and a leading cause of death
by themselves (Mensah and Brown, 2007. Heat waves can exacerbate the medical
problems associated with these conditions. When facing heat stress, a body usually
speeds up blood circulation as part of the thermoregulative response. The ability to do
so is impaired in those with cardiovascular conditions (Bouchama and Knochel, 2002)
and in the elderly in general (Gronlund, Zanobetti, Wellenius, Schwartz, and O’Neill,
2016). This increases the probability of more severe effects such as heat stroke and
–ultimately– increases the likelihood of death. A similar coupling exists between heat
stroke and diseases of the respiratory system as well as of the nervous system. Heat
strokes tend to affect both systems (Bouchama and Knochel, 2002), thus aggravating
existing conditions. As a result, people affected by diseases of the respiratory systems
face a higher likelihood of heat wave-related death (F. Ballester et al., 1997; Huynen
et al., 2001; Patz et al., 2005; Fouillet et al., 2006; Hajat et al., 2007) as well as those
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affected by diseases of the nervous system (Fouillet et al., 2006). Further notable is
the case of those with degenerative diseases such as dementia. Here, medication pro-
vided against the condition in question inhibits the body’s ability to thermoregulate
(Zanobetti, O’Neill, Gronlund, and Schwartz, 2013), again resulting in a situation
where heat waves have a higher likelihood of severe outcomes. Other medication and
drugs can have similar effects and possibly lead to increased vulnerability during a
heat wave (Luber and McGeehin, 2008).
A common denominator of all the factors concerning human physiology is that there is
no lasting effect of heat. Once an episode of high temperatures is over and once one’s
body temperature has cooled down sufficiently, no lasting effect is to be expected. This
claim finds empirical support in the literature (Anderson and Bell, 2009). Hence, heat
wave-related excess mortality comes in form of a sharp peak, which is superimposed
on the base rate mortality (Kovats and Hajat, 2008). It is this characteristic, that ul-
timately allows the detection of heat-wave related mortality using singular spectrum
analysis. As is subsequently shown, this allows the separation of signal from noise.
Given that the primary victims of heat waves are those with a lowered life expectancy,
there is an argument in favor of mortality rates being reduced directly after a heat
wave. This is referred to as harvesting effect. Literature is somewhat divided on the
topic. Some authors do not find any evidence for the harvesting effect (e.g. Robine
et al., 2008) or are inconclusive (e.g. Huynen et al., 2001), while others find evidence
(e.g. Baccini et al., 2008). A review article on the effects of heat waves on mortality
notes that the harvesting effect is only mentioned in few studies (A˚stro¨m, Forsberg,
and Rocklo¨v, 2011). Nevertheless, the theoretic argument in favor of the harvesting
effect remains. Given that there are many confounding factors –and hence a lot of
noise– when it comes to causes of human mortality, the signal of the harvesting ef-
fect might just be too weak in order to be detectable in many studies. In a similar
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fashion, there is also an argument that heat waves that occur early in any given year
are more impactful than those occurring later. The reason for this could either be the
harvesting effect –as the more susceptible individuals are killed in the first heat wave–
or adaptation, as individuals who have not yet experienced heat waves might be less
prepared than those that have (Barnett, Hajat, Gasparrini, and Rocklo¨v, 2012).
This also illustrates that vulnerability to heat waves is not only based on human phys-
iology, but also on socio-economic factors. As Changnon et al. (1996) and Madrigano
et al. (2015) show for the case of Chicago and New York City respectively, black in-
dividuals are more likely to die during a heat wave than non-black individuals. This
disparity between the races can be partially explained by differences in access to air
conditioning (O’Neill, Zanobetti, and Schwartz, 2005) as well as by differences in gen-
eral health (Gronlund et al., 2016). Hence, the disparity could thus be corrected with
appropriate public health policies. Similarly, a lack of education and poverty in gen-
eral increase vulnerability to extreme heat (Reid et al., 2009; O’Neill, Zanobetti, and
Schwartz, 2003). Some communities simply lack the capability to prepare for heat
waves. This insight is consistent with literature on resilience research and human
geography (see e.g. Adger, 1999). These vulnerabilities multiply when adverse socio-
economic conditions and fragile health concur (Gronlund, Berrocal, White-Newsome,
Conlon, and O’Neill, 2015).
Preparing for and adapting to heat waves can take several forms. First, there is behav-
ioral change, which can be promoted by institutions of public health. Weisskopf et al.
(2002) find that –using data from Milwaukee– that, when controlling for confounding
factors, the expected number of deaths due to any given heat wave decreased between
1995 and 1999. They suggest that improvements in public health institutions, par-
ticularly public heat advisories that inform the public about upcoming heat waves,
are a possible explanation for this phenomena. Other authors (Semenza et al., 1996;
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Easterling et al., 2000; Luber and McGeehin, 2008) also emphasize the importance
of optimizing warning systems and increasing awareness when it comes to reducing
deaths due to natural hazards. Second, there is physical adaptation such as via the in-
troduction of private air conditioning. Barreca et al. (2016) show that the impact of a
single heat wave on human mortality in the US has been decreasing over the twentieth
century and that this can be explained by the widespread adoption of air condition-
ing. A similar development can also be expected in Europe, where market penetration
of air conditioning has increased over the last two decades (Pezzutto, Fazeli, De Fe-
lice, and Sparber, 2016). Air conditioning seems particularly important in an urban
setting, where –due to the urban heat island effect (McGeehin and Mirabelli, 2001)–
nighttime temperatures are higher than in a rural environment (Changnon et al.,
1996). The positive effect of air conditioning is independent of socio-economic factors
(Ostro, Rauch, Green, Malig, and Basu, 2010) and it is even possible to use air con-
ditioning to compensate for physiological risk factors as Barnett (2007) shows for the
case of cardiovascular diseases.
Adaptation can also be observed in a broader sense – communities and cities in the
US and Europe that are located in a warmer climate are less sensible to episodes
of high temperatures than those located in a colder climate (Vandentorren et al.,
2004; Baccini et al., 2008; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011; Barreca, Clay, Desch-
enes, Greenstone, and Shapiro, 2015). This intuitively makes sense as it is reasonable
to expect populations to be adapted to their local climate (Kovats and Hajat, 2008).
Yet, this also means that estimates of the impact of heat waves for one population
cannot readily be used for another one (Anderson and Bell, 2009).
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Heat Wave Measure and Data
In the literature there is no consensus on a universal definition of heat waves
(Robinson, 2001). Definitions are generally chosen based on the goal of the respective
study as well as on the background of the involved researchers (T. T. Smith, Zaitchik,
and Gohlke, 2013).
In its simplest form, a heat wave can be defined as an event during which the
minimum or maximum daily temperature reaches a pre-defined threshold. This
threshold can either be fixed to be universal (see e.g. Robinson, 2001) or it can
be defined relative to a local climatology (see e.g. Gronlund et al., 2016). A more
complicated form demands that both minimum and maximum temperatures are
above their respective thresholds (see e.g. Robinson, 2001) or asks for an interpolation
of the daily maximum and minimum temperatures (Snyder, 1985). Further, some
definitions include duration next to intensity and look for a minimum length of the
event such as two (Madrigano et al., 2015), three (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004) or even
five days (Huynen et al., 2001).
Besides temperature, humidity is an important determinant for heat stress. Con-
sequently, heat waves measure can be constructed using a combination thereof.
Epstein and Moran (2006) suggest using the discomfort index, which is based on
both dry-bulb and wet-bulb temperature, as it is straightforward to calculate and
easy to use. More complicated measures such as the apparent temperature exist and
are used in research (see e.g. Gronlund et al., 2015).
Some authors find that different measures for heat waves do not influence their
results by a lot (Gronlund et al., 2016). Here, explorative data analysis confirmed
this sentiment. The likely reason for this finding being the coarse temporal resolution
of the data used. Accordingly, a comparatively simple measure for heat waves was
chosen. It is based on daily maximum temperatures alone and utilizes thresholds
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that are defined relative to the local climatology.
The climate data set used, E-OBS 12.0, is provided by the European Climate
Assessment & Dataset project (Haylock et al., 2008) and contains the maximum
daily temperatures for Europe from 1950 to 2015 on 0.25 degree grid cells. For
each of these grid cells, a reference summer climatology is calculated, using the
months of April to September during the period of 1951 to 1980. Based on each
grid cell’s reference climatology, a heat wave is defined as an event exceeding the
+2σ-threshold. The heat wave measure is the number of days per month that meet
this criteria.
Given that it is not plausible to assume that the population within a country is
uniformly distributed, the individual grid cells are weighted by population. The
importance of this weighting becomes apparent when thinking about the spatial het-
erogeneity within Europe. Mountainous regions tend to support a lower population
density while being subject to fewer heat waves than lower lying areas. Assuming a
uniform distribution of population in mountainous countries such as Spain or Austria
will thus underestimate the actual heat stress on the population. It is therefore
important to consider the actual geographic distribution of the population. The
data on population density, GEOSTAT 2011 V2, are provided by Eurostat and the
European Forum for GeoStatistics (Eurostat and EFGS, 2015) on 1 km2 grid-cells.
Unfortunately, only information on the distribution of the European population
in 2011 is available. Nevertheless, this is more appropriate than to just assume a
uniform distribution of the population within the respective countries.
In order to assess the temporal resolution needed for meaningful results, the monthly
data are also accumulated to quarters and years.
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Estimating Excess Mortality
In order to identify the impact of extreme heat events, excess mortality estimates need
to be isolated. Singular systems analysis has many advantageous properties that are
useful when doing so. Its fundamental idea is to capture as much of the underlying
structure of the data with as few functions as possible. Effectively, it is a specialized
application of principal components analysis on a single time series. Up to a certain
degree, it is similar to classic spectral analysis as it decomposes a time series into
a set of orthogonal functions. Yet, unlike classic spectral analysis, these orthogonal
functions need not be a set of harmonics. As a result, singular spectrum analysis is
more robust and agnostic with respect to the underlying structure of the data. This
is useful when isolating excess mortality: First, modulations in amplitude can be ac-
counted for (Elsner and Tsonis, 1996) as can non-sinusoidal, i.e. anharmonic, motions
(Ghil et al., 2002). This allows to account for exogenous factors –such as an unusually
mild winter– that might have short-term effects on mortality. Then, nonlinear filter-
ing (Elsner and Tsonis, 1996) allows to capture the nonlinear trend in the base rates.
Thus, a wide range of country-specific long-term shifts such as resulting from changes
in the political landscape can be accounted for without facing the challenge of an
omitted variable bias. Last, singular systems analysis is a non-parametric method.
Hence no particular structure needs to be imposed on the data, even if the respective
data series are short and noisy (Vautard, Yiou, and Ghil, 1992; Ghil et al., 2002).
Other country-level estimations methods, fixed effects models and spectral analysis,
need to enforce one of two conditions. These conditions can be relaxed here as a result
of the non-parametric nature of singular systems analysis. Fixed effects models (see
e.g. Deschenes et al., 2009; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011) generally need to assume
linear additivity, unless the time series spans over a long time horizon (Bai, 2009),
which is not the case here. Classic spectral analysis (see e.g. Granger and Hatanka,
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1964) on the other hand relies on representing data using a combination of sine and
cosine functions. Using singular systems analysis means to be able to relax both of
these conditions. As a result, this allows to widen the set of examined countries to
those that have only recently started to collect data on public health.
Fixed effects models are common in econometric research, where they are used to cap-
ture unobserved heterogenous effects of explanatory variables (Montgomery, 2009),
including effects of time (see e.g. Currie and Neidell, 2005). The underlying idea is to
introduce treatment-specific intercepts into a standard regression model while keep-
ing the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable the same across
the treatments. In this work, there are two treatments for each country-specific time
series: Month fixed effects and year fixed effects, The effect of heat waves on the de-
pendent variable, βc is assumed as time-invariant within a country. This model can
be conceptualized as follows:
xct = αcmy + hctβc + cmy (1.1)
Here, xct is the dependent variable of country c at time t, hct is the independent
variable, that is the heat wave measure, and αcmy is the estimated month- and year-
specific intercept. βc is the estimated interaction coefficient and cmy is the month-
and year-specific error coefficient.
The standard spectral analysis approach uses a combination of sine and cosine func-
tions to account for the seasonal variation in the time series. After subtracting the
year-specific mean from the data, the Fourier transform of the resulting residual can
be calculated. Assuming a perfect seasonal cycle, an ideal filter is applied and all
other frequencies are set to zero. The filtered Fourier transform of the residuals is
then transformed back into the time-domain. The result is the fitted estimate of the
yearly fluctuation of the original time series.
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Estimating excess mortality using singular spectrum analysis is done in several steps.
First, lagged and de-meaned segments of the country-specific mortality rates are em-
bedded into a vector space. Then, information in form of pairs of eigenvectors and
eigenvalues are extracted from this vector space using spectral decomposition. The
eigenvalues allow to select those eigenvectors that capture at least 5% of the total
data variation; the other eigenvectors are discarded. Finally, the respective signal
components can be reconstructed using the remaining eigenvectors. The sum of these
reconstructed signal components represent the de-meaned base rate mortality.
The window length or embedding dimension, Mc, is chosen depending on the available
data and the objective of the analysis. As the smallest resolvable frequency is inversely
proportional to the embedding dimension, Mc needs to be long enough to resolve the
seasonal oscillation. To increase separability, Mc should be a multiple of the length
of this seasonal oscillation (Hassani, 2007). Further, Mc should not be longer than
one third of the length of the original data series in order to avoid making statistical
errors too influential (Vautard et al., 1992). In this work, 48 months is chosen as
the window length for the analysis of the monthly mortality data of all 27 examined
countries, meaning that the smallest resolvable frequency was f = 1
48
month−1.
Using this window length, a trajectory matrix X˜c, a Mc x N
′
c multivariate data set,
is created for each country c using lagged and de-meaned segments of the original
mortality data series Xc of length Nc:
X˜c =

(xc1 − x¯c) (xc2 − x¯c) . . . (xcN′c − x¯c)









x˜c1 x˜c2 . . . x˜cN′c









The number of columns of this trajectory matrix is Mc and the number of columns
of is N ′c = Nc −Mc + 1.
Using singular value decomposition, the trajectory matrix can be deconstructed into
its left singular vector, Wc, into its right singular vector, Sc, and into a diagonal









Ec = Wc (1.5)
Using both principal components and eigenvectors, the set of signal components Rκc
can then be reconstructed for each country c, following the approach by Ghil et al.
(2002):









κc is the set of modes used in the decomposition. As a result of the use of lagged
segments of the original data, the reconstruction of the endpoints of the signal com-
ponents only includes some of the principal component and eigenvector pairs. The
respective lower summation bounds, Lct , and upper summation bounds, Uct , are de-
fined as follows (Ghil et al., 2002):
(Mct , Lct , Uct) = (
1
t
, 1, t) for 1 ≤ t ≤Mc − 1 (1.7)
(Mct , Lct , Uct) = (
1
Mc
, 1,Mc) for Mc ≤ t ≤ Nc −Mc + 1 (1.8)
(Mct , Lct , Uct) = (
1
Nc − t+ 1 , t−Nc +Mc,Mc) for Nc −Mc + 2 ≤ t ≤ Nc (1.9)
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Mct is the normalization factor needed to adjust the scale of the reconstructed signal
components for the difference in number of included principal component an eigen-
vector pairs.
To determine how many of the reconstructed modes are actually of importance, the
signal-to-noise ratio –that is the fraction of the total variance, that is explained by









As part of this analysis, all signal components with a signal-to-noise ratio of less
than 5% are discarded, as are signal components that represent oscillations with a
frequency higher than f = 1
12
month−1. The remaining kc signal components plus the
mean mortality rates together form the base rate mortality — subtracting it from the
actual mortality rates leads to the excess mortality estimates, yc.
In this work, between two and five signal components are retained and reconstructed
per country. On average, these signal components capture 64.48% of total variation
in mortality. Table 1.1 below shows the number of retained signal components and
the level of captured variance for each of the 27 examined countries.
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United Kingdom 3 71.91
Table 1.1: Retained signal components for mortality rates by country. Num-
ber of the retained signal components for mortality rates by country and their share
of total variance of mortality.
Figure 1.1 shows the reconstructed signal components for the monthly mortality data
from Germany together with their power spectrum. The first two reconstructed signal
components show a peak in their power at f = 1
12
month−1, indicating that both
represent the seasonal component of the base rate mortality. The third reconstructed
signal components shows a peak in its power at f = 1
48
month−1. Here, this frequency
is the smallest resolvable frequency, meaning that this signal component depicts a


























































































































Figure 1.1: Signal components and their power spectrum for German mor-
tality rates. The first two signal components represent a seasonal fluctuation; the
third signal component represents a nonlinear trend.
When combining these three signal components with the mean mortality rate, base
rate mortality is obtained. Figure 1.2 shows this base rate mortality plotted on top
of the observed mortality for Germany. It captures a total of 58.87% of the variation



























Figure 1.2: Base rate mortality estimates and observed mortality rates in
Germany from 1990 to 2013. Base rate mortality estimates are plotted in black;
observed mortality rates are plotted in grey.
Subtracting the reconstructed signal components and the mean from the observed
mortality rates leads to the estimates of excess mortality. As excess mortality should
be influenced by heat waves, high levels in the heat wave measure should coincide
with peaks in excess mortality. Figure 1.3 shows that this is the case, again using









































Figure 1.3: Excess mortality estimates and heat wave measure in Germany
during April to September, 1990 to 2013. Excess mortality estimates are plotted
in black; heat waves measure is plotted as grey bars.
Finally, excess mortality estimates yc are regressed in an ordinary least squares ap-
proach against the heat wave measure:
yct = θc + hctηc + ξc (1.12)
Here, hct is the heat wave measure of country c at time t, θc is the intercept, ηc is
the estimated interaction coefficient, and ξc is the error-coefficient.
1.3 Results
Results are divided into three parts: First, the estimated effect of heat waves on hu-
man mortality –using the monthly-level data– is provide for each country. Second,
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comparisons of the performance of the presented methodology with the established
literature using monthly-level data are made. Third, comparisons between the differ-
ent temporal scales are drawn.
Heat Waves and Their Effect on Human Mortality
Estimates for the impact of individual heat waves on the respective countries are
given in table 1.2 together with their level of significance. Further, for each country,
an estimated number of deaths including standard errors is provided.
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country data length interaction coefficient number of deaths average mortality
(years) (deaths per heatwave caused by heat waves caused by heat waves
and 1000 people) (average per year) (percent of total mortality)
Austria 54 0.011 ∗∗∗ 311 (± 34) 0.40
Belgium 39 0.008 ∗∗∗ 423 (± 53) 0.40
Bulgaria 20 0.015 ∗∗∗ 463 (± 94) 0.45
Croatia 22 0.011 ∗∗∗ 294 (± 36) 0.60
Czech Republic 19 0.007 ∗∗∗ 353 (± 63) 0.34
Denmark 54 0.012 ∗∗∗ 150 (± 20) 0.28
Estonia 25 0.010 ∗∗∗ 40 (± 10) 0.24
Finland 54 0.015 ∗∗∗ 101 (± 14) 0.22
France 19 0.011 ∗∗∗ 5410 (± 499) 1.03
Germany 23 0.010 ∗∗∗ 5609 (± 481) 0.67
Greece 54 0.066 ∗∗∗ 661 (± 47) 0.68
Hungary 20 0.010 ∗∗∗ 464 (± 84) 0.37
Italy 54 0.029 ∗∗∗ 3302 (± 259) 0.59
Latvia 18 0.014 ∗∗∗ 84 (± 19) 0.28
Lithuania 20 0.013 ∗∗∗ 127 (± 29) 0.32
Macedonia 19 0.008 ∗∗∗ 65 (± 14) 0.37
Netherlands 24 0.008 ∗∗∗ 1045 (± 87) 0.78
Norway 54 0.008 ∗∗∗ 104 (± 18) 0.26
Poland 19 0.009 ∗∗∗ 1229 (± 209) 0.34
Portugal 54 0.027 ∗∗∗ 1059 (± 81) 1.14
Romania 19 0.007 ∗∗∗ 566 (± 201) 0.24
Slovakia 18 0.007 ∗∗∗ 201 (± 41) 0.39
Slovenia 18 0.005 ∗∗∗ 72 (± 19) 0.40
Spain 39 0.039 ∗∗∗ 3563 (± 271) 1.07
Sweden 54 0.012 ∗∗∗ 239 (± 28) 0.28
Switzerland 54 0.007 ∗∗∗ 153 (± 19) 0.26
United Kingdom 32 0.005 ∗∗∗ 2012 (± 427) 0.35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.2: Interaction coefficients of heat wave measures. Interaction coeffi-
cients represent the increase in monthly mortality rates for each heat wave event;
heat-caused excess deaths are given as yearly average per country.
The estimates vary significantly across countries. Some countries such as Spain and
Greece suffer from higher mortality during individual high temperature events than
other countries such as Germany or Switzerland. One reason for this is that the exam-
ined countries differ significantly with respect to the age structure of their population,
their health care system, as well as their economic and institutional capabilities.
When looking at the average number of deaths, two types of countries are least af-
fected in terms of total deaths: Countries in Scandinavia and countries with a small
population. Based on the estimates, the total number of deaths due to heat waves
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can be calculated — on average, around 28,100 people die every year in the 27 coun-
tries combined. This considerable number stresses the importance of avoiding heat
wave-related deaths when it comes to successful public health policies. It can be de-
rived that an average of 0.61% of all mortality in the examined 27 countries is excess
mortality caused by heat waves. This estimate goes up to 1.14% in the worst-affected
country, Portugal.
Relative Model Performance
The performance of the approach using singular spectrum analysis as compared
to that of the fixed effects model and classic spectral analysis is evaluated using
leave-one-out cross validation. In case of the approaches using singular spectrum
analysis and spectral analysis, the estimates of excess mortality are regressed against
the heat wave measure, in case of the fixed effects model, the mortality rate is
regressed against the heat wave measure using year and month fixed effects. One
observation is dropped from the sample and then predicted using the remaining
observations. This is repeated for each observation. The difference between predicted
values and actual observation is used to evaluate absolute performance below in
table 1.3:
27
country leave-one-out cross validation using root mean squared error
(singular spectrum analysis) (fixed effects model) (spectral analysis)
Austria 0.03 0.03 0.41
Belgium 0.03 0.03 0.43
Bulgaria 0.06 0.04 0.71
Croatia 0.03 0.03 0.39
Czech Republic 0.02 0.02 0.27
Denmark 0.03 0.03 0.35
Estonia 0.04 0.04 0.53
Finland 0.03 0.03 0.33
France 0.03 0.03 0.32
Germany 0.02 0.02 0.30
Greece 0.05 0.04 0.55
Hungary 0.03 0.03 0.47
Italy 0.04 0.03 0.44
Latvia 0.04 0.04 0.56
Lithuania 0.04 0.04 0.58
Macedonia 0.03 0.03 0.49
Netherlands 0.02 0.02 0.26
Norway 0.03 0.02 0.30
Poland 0.02 0.02 0.30
Portugal 0.04 0.04 0.52
Romania 0.05 0.03 0.62
Slovakia 0.03 0.02 0.32
Slovenia 0.03 0.03 0.39
Spain 0.03 0.02 0.35
Sweden 0.02 0.02 0.30
Switzerland 0.02 0.02 0.31
United Kingdom 0.03 0.03 0.45
Table 1.3: Performance comparison of three different identification strate-
gies using leave-one-out cross validation. The approach using singular systems
analysis is the described in depth in the main body of this chapter; the fixed effects
model uses year- and month-fixed effects; spectral analysis uses an optimal band filter.
Using root mean squared error as a measure of performance, this shows that classic
spectral analysis performs significantly worse than both of the other approaches. Con-
sequently, it is not discussed here any further. As the actual number of deaths caused
by heat waves is unknown, leave-one-out cross validation is unsuitable to classify the
performance of either methodology relative to a more conventional approach.
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Model Performance Comparison
The 2003 heat wave in Europe, that affected larger parts of Western Europe, offers
a good opportunity for comparing the model performance. This heat wave took
place during the first half August 2013 and primarily affected France. The heat wave
was unprecedented in terms of intensity and duration (Vandentorren et al., 2004;
Poumade`re, Mays, Le Mer, and Blong, 2005) and had a severe impact on many
European countries. A consequence of this was a certain lack of preparedness. In
Paris, where the highest spike in mortality was recorded (Fouillet et al., 2006), many
of the victims lived alone, without access to air conditioning (Poumade`re et al.,
2005). Socio-economic factors aggravated the underlying physiological conditions
and mortality was generally higher in cities that had experience less heat before
(Vandentorren et al., 2004). The combination of extreme temperatures with these
issues resulted in a very high death count. Subsequently, the heat wave was exten-
sively discussed in the media and widely picked up for the academic study of the
relationship between heat waves and human mortality.
One study on the 2003 heat wave (Robine et al., 2008) seems particularly suited for
the comparison of performance. Most of the other research on the 2003 heat wave fo-
cuses on individual countries such as France (Fouillet et al., 2006), Italy (Conti et al.,
2005), and Switzerland (Grize, Huss, Thommer, Schindler, and Braun-Fahrla¨nder,
2005). Some research concentrates on even smaller samples such as individual cities
(Vandentorren et al., 2004) or vulnerable individuals (Vandentorren et al., 2006). As
the underlying mortality data are not consistent across these research papers, the
creation of a single data set of estimates of excess deaths is not straightforward at all.
There would be a need for harmonizing estimates. Hence, a comparison using such a
data set would always have to deal with confounding errors. Differences in estimates
could be due to shortcomings in the model or due to imperfect harmonization. Hence
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the comparison with Robine et al. (2008). They derive heat-related excess deaths
from daily data for a period of four months during summer 2003, using the same
period during the years of 1998 to 2002 as a baseline. While this analysis does not
take cause-of-death into account, it provides estimates for 16 European countries,
which is significantly more than any other research study. Table 1.4 compares
predictions from the approach using singular spectrum analysis and from a fixed
effects model with the results from Robine et al. (2008).
month excess deaths during summer 2003
(singular spectrum analysis) (fixed effects model) (Robine et al., 2008)
June 12,305 9,125 12,387
July 10,254 7,410 10,456
August 37,831 27,822 42,545
September 914 838 4,816
total 61,304 45,195 70,188
Table 1.4: Comparison of estimated excess mortality with the established
literature. The approach using singular systems analysis is the described in depth
in the main body of this chapter; the fixed effects model uses year- and month-fixed
effects; Robine et al. (2008) use hospital-level data.
As can be seen in the table, the fixed effects model consistently underestimates the
number of heat-related excess deaths. In contrast, the model used in this work pro-
vides estimates for June and July 2003 that are very close to the results by Robine
et al. (2008). Its estimates for August and September 2003, however, are smaller. The
reason for this can not be determined conclusively. Given the available temperature
data, Robine et al. (2008) should not find as many excess deaths in September as
they did. This enigma illustrates the problem with models based on all-cause mortal-
ity data; noise can not always be identified without fail.
One possible explanation for the different performance across the models is that both
the fixed effects model and classic spectral analysis need to assume a certain struc-
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ture of the data, such as linear additivity of the underlying factors. This limits both
to representing harmonic oscillations, while singular spectrum analysis is not limited
in the same way. As can be seen in figure 1.1, the seasonal component of the base
rate mortality is subject to modulations of its amplitude, while the trend component
follows a nonlinear motion. The combination of these effects might be beyond the
limits for both fixed effects model and classic spectral analysis.
Temporal Scales
Depending on the specific region, monthly country-level mortality rates might not
be available. Hence it seems important to test whether the presented methodology
also works with even coarser data. For that purpose, the data on mortality were
accumulated on a quarter- as well as on a year-level before estimating excess
mortality using singular spectrum analysis. As table 1.5 shows, this does not lead to
significant estimators in most cases.
In only three –in case of the quarter-level data– or four –in case of the yearly data–
out of the 27 countries, estimates for the impact of heat waves can be derived that
are significant at the p = 0.05 level. This suggests that data on the monthly-level





Austria 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.005
Belgium 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
Bulgaria 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.001
Croatia 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002
Czech Republic 0.006 ∗∗ 0.002 0.005 ∗∗
Denmark 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.003
Estonia 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
Finland 0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003
France 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗∗ 0.005
Germany 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004
Greece 0.060 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗ 0.049 ∗∗∗
Hungary 0.009 ∗∗ 0.001 0.003
Italy 0.026 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.000 ∗∗
Latvia 0.011 ∗∗ 0.004 0.003
Lithuania 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.014
Macedonia 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
Netherlands 0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003
Norway 0.008 ∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.004
Poland 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002
Portugal 0.024 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004
Romania 0.005 ∗ 0.000 0.002
Slovakia 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002
Slovenia 0.004 ∗∗ 0.002 ∗ 0.001
Spain 0.032 ∗∗∗ 0.004 0.020 ∗
Sweden 0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.009
Switzerland 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006
United Kingdom 0.005 ∗∗ 0.000 0.003
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Comparison of regression coefficients of different temporal scales.
For each country and temporal scale, regression coefficients are provided with level
of significance.
Note that the estimates in the table above are derived using all available data, includ-
ing the winters, in order to preserve comparability. As a result, the estimates based
on the monthly-level data are slightly different than the ones presented before.
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1.4 Discussion
As demonstrated, the methodology presented provides worthwhile insights into the
large-scale effects of heat waves on human mortality. It does not need detailed daily
health data, which can be difficult and costly to acquire. Monthly mortality rates on
a country level are sufficient to obtain reasonable estimates. As a result, the analysis
of the impact of heat waves can be expanded to countries for which no detailed data
are available.
Robustness and Limitations
As the comparison with the results from Robine et al. (2008) shows, heat-related
excess deaths can be estimated using singular spectrum analysis in a meaningful way.
The comparison also shows that the estimated numbers are likely underestimating
the number of deaths due to extreme heat waves. In case of the heat wave in 2003,
the difference across the four observed months was 12.66%. Overall, due the rarity of
events of this magnitude, the absolute difference is likely smaller.
A significant part of the underestimation is the result of delayed mortality. A con-
siderable number of heat-related excess deaths occurred in September 2003, that is
during a period which was not characterized by extraordinary heat. This provides
evidence for extreme heat waves possibly having a lasting effect on public health.
However, the introduction of lags into the regression model did not improve its per-
formance, suggesting that this might only matter for the most extreme heat waves.
As these kind of heat waves can be expected to become more frequent as a result of
ongoing climate change, this corollary should be kept in mind when predicting the
future impact of climate change on public health.
All of the 27 examined countries had continuous time series of health data of at least
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18 years. Time series longer than that do not increase the model performance — the
root mean squared prediction error in leave-one-out cross validation does not decrease
with increased length of the time series. This means that this particular application of
singular spectrum analysis shows similar robustness with respect to short time series
as is expected from the general application (see Vautard et al., 1992).
Yet, in some cases, no meaningful estimates can be derived even in case of the monthly
data. This is the case for countries where only extremely short continuous time se-
ries of public health data exist. This is the case for Albania, where there are only
three years of continuous mortality data available. There is a similar challenge in case
of small population numbers such as for Liechtenstein with a population averaging
about 30,000 people at a time. In either case, the signal is not strong enough to be
separated from the noise. These limitations can not overcome by any approach using
data on a country level. For either of these cases, detailed data from hospitals are
needed.
Conclusions
While episodes of high temperatures seem –at least as of now– not to be the major
driver of human mortality in the examined European countries, they are bound to
become more important. Consequently, public health and climate adaptation policies
need to address extreme heat. This work estimates that heat waves cause a share of
up to 1.18% of all mortality in countries across Europe – the issue is therefore not
to be underestimated. In a changing climate, with increasingly frequent temperature
extremes, it does not seem unlikely to expect a rise in heat-related excess mortality
in the near future. Some of the heat wave-related deaths might be avoidable through
adaptation (see e.g. Barreca et al., 2016); further research on the large-scale effects
of heat waves on human mortality in Europe is thus needed.
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The presented methodology, based on singular spectrum analysis, is not without lim-
itations, particularly when it comes to very short time series and very low numbers
of affected individuals. Yet, it outperforms the more standard approaches using fixed
effects or combinations of sine- and cosine-functions to model the yearly fluctuations
in base rate mortality. Generally speaking, it captures a higher share of variability
in mortality as it does not force a particular structure on the data. As the results
indicate, singular spectrum analysis is a valid tool to estimate the large-scale effects
of heat waves on human mortality and offers certain analytical advantages over the
more established approaches.
While micro-level approaches using detailed hospital-level data could provide more
insights into particular events, the needed data are not available for many countries,
making comparisons across broader regions essentially impossible. Thus, macro-level
approaches like the one presented, are a valuable complement to the existing litera-
ture and can help to draw the attention of policy makers to the dangers of extreme
temperature events as well as to the adaptation measures needed.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Extreme Temperature Events in Europe:
Winners and Losers of Climate Change
The increasing frequency of heat waves is the most perceivable effect of climate change
and accordingly is most frequently discussed in the media. While this increase is
framed as a threat to public health, the accompanying decrease in cold spells also
offers tremendous advantages. The resulting net effect for different climate scenarios
is mostly unknown.
Here I exploit the periodic fluctuations in mortality rates using a combination of
frequency and time domain time series analyses in order to identify the magnitude of
both trends.
I find that climate change does not need to be a threat to public health in Europe,
depending on the degree of warming: Under a scenario of moderate climate change
with fewer cold spells, excess mortality can be reduced by as much as 1.0%. Yet, under
a scenario of severe climate change with significantly more frequent heat waves, a net
increase in mortality –on average 3.6%– is expected.
Taken together, this demonstrates the need for effective climate change mitigation;
otherwise there will only be losers, no winners.
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2.1 Motivation
The impact of extreme temperature events is easily conceivable: Blistering heat causes
discomfort, as does bitter cold. Either can lead to death. At a community level, linking
these events to negative health outcomes is easily possible using data from hospitals.
Yet, at many locations, this kind of data is noisy or not available at all, making a
large-scale analysis difficult or impossible. Accordingly, our understanding of the in-
terplay between temperature extremes and public health is predominantly limited to
case studies, mostly cities or particular events. Only recently, comprehensive studies
of a larger geographic area, the United States, have been published (Barreca, 2012;
Barreca et al., 2016). However, given the structural and socio-economic differences
across countries –resulting in possibly very different trajectories with respect to vul-
nerability to extreme temperature events– even the latter study does not support
strong conclusions about other parts of the world. There is evidence that the impacts
of extreme temperature events vary across communities (Baccini et al., 2008), possi-
bly due to acclimatization (Anderson and Bell, 2009) or due to access to adaptation
measures (O’Neill et al., 2005). This suggests that the change in the frequency of
extreme temperature events due to climate change could have varying effects on dif-
ferent parts of the world.
Improving upon current understanding of the impact of extreme temperature events
is crucial. Climate change can be perceived as a significant environmental threat to
public health for many reasons (Watts et al., 2015); one of them being the upwards
shift in the frequency of extreme temperature events (Easterling et al., 2000; Alexan-
der et al., 2006) that occurs in addition to the increase of average temperatures. Heat
waves are becoming more frequent and more intense (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004), while
cold spells are becoming less common. Both types of extreme temperature event have
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detrimental effects on human health (Barnett, 2007; Anderson and Bell, 2009). Ei-
ther increases human morbidity and mortality (Dı´az et al., 2005; J. Ballester, Rodo,
Robine, and Herrman, 2016). Affected are primarily people with medical conditions
and the elderly (Huynen et al., 2001; Analitis et al., 2008). Heat waves are likely more
dangerous than cold spells (Barnett et al., 2012). Projections point towards a further
increase in their occurrence (Fischer and Knutti, 2015) along with the shift in the
current climatology as a result of ongoing anthropogenic climate change. As a result,
catastrophes such as the August 2003 heat wave in Western Europe that caused ten
thousands of deaths (Robine et al., 2008) might be a more common occurrence in the
future. Hansen et al. (2012) –focusing primarily on hot extremes– describe this new
climatology as ”loaded climate dice” (p. 2418), framing it as a danger to public wel-
fare in line with other literature (IPCC, 2014b). Yet, when considering the reduction
of cold spells, moderate climate change might also be considered an opportunity –not
a threat– when looking at public health.
This work tries to assess this question for the case of Europe. This location was chosen
for several reasons. Europe consists of many small countries with different levels of
economic development, each with their own economic and political system. Further,
there are several climate zones in Europe, some of which are expected to shift as a
result of climate change (Seneviratne, Lu¨thi, Litschi, and Scha¨r, 2006). The resulting
change in extreme heat and extreme cold events shows a significant degree of spa-
tial heterogeneity (Elguindi, Rauscher, and Giorgi, 2013). Last, comparable data are
available for most European countries, thanks to the work of the European Union
and its statistical office. Together, this means that there are reliable data with a
unique level of variation in both mortality and climate, making the identification of
the effect of temperature extremes on public health comparatively easier in Europe
than in many other parts of the world.
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Mortality rates oscillate in a nonlinear motion, making classic time-domain ap-
proaches based on linearly additive fixed effects potentially misleading. This work
uses a non-parametric method mirroring principal components analysis of a time se-
ries in order to avoid forcing a certain structure on the data. This method, singular
systems analysis, can exploit both month-to-month and year-to-year variation and
is used here to extract excess mortality from Eurostat’s monthly mortality data on
Europe. The method is described in detail in chapter 1 of this work.
Excess mortality is combined with an extreme temperature measure. This measure is
based on the distribution of maximum temperatures relative to a baseline climatol-
ogy using high resolution gridded climate data. Weighting the individual grid cells by
population density allows to account for differences in the geographic features within
the respective countries.
I begin by showing that extreme temperature events had a considerable impact on
human mortality in Europe during the second half of the 20th century. Combined,
heat waves and cold spells account for up to 1.78% of all mortality within a country.
While there is a large degree of spatial heterogeneity, my analysis suggests that an
average of 36,100 deaths per year are caused by temperature extremes in the exam-
ined 27 European countries.
Next, I demonstrate that climate change has already changed the pattern of heat
waves and cold spells and that this has led to a net increase of excess deaths; over
17,000 additional people died in the last decade when compared to a 1951 – 1980
reference climatology. Increases in heat waves amounted to 25,600 deaths, while de-
creases in cold spells led to 8,600 fewer deaths. Individual countries suffered up to
1.14% of additional mortality. This result concurs with the viewpoint that climate
change is a threat, yet it in itself does not allow predictions about the impact of a
further changing climate.
39
Lastly, I analyze this impact of future climate change under two different scenarios,
one of moderate and one of severe warming. While excess mortality could be reduced
by up to 1.0% in case of moderate warming, on average it will increase by as much
as 3.7% under severe warming. As a result of a combination of biophysical and socio-
economic factors some regions will be affected more by climate change than others.
Particularly countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea suffer from a drastic increase
of heat waves early on while not profiting much from a decrease in cold spells. This
approach allows to outline a roadmap of needed mitigation measures; countries that
are affected negatively under both scenarios need to implement adaptation policies
earlier than those only affected negatively by severe warming.
My findings suggest that climate change might further develop as threat to public
health in Europe, but that it does not have to. In contrast, restricting it to a moderate
level of warming offers benefits to several countries, primarily to France, as well as
some of the Benelux countries and those in Scandinavia; thus creating winners and
losers in the process.
2.2 Methodology
The methodology is based on the idea developed in the first chapter and extending
upon the approach presented by Hansen et al. (2012). Excess mortality for 31 Euro-
pean countries is estimated using singular spectrum analysis on data from Eurostat
(Eurostat, 2015). Data on maximum daily temperatures for Europe from 1950 to
2015 are again taken from European Climate Assessment & Dataset project (E-OBS
12.0, Haylock et al., 2008). This temperature data set is split into a summer- and a
winter-half. Two reference climatologies –one for winter, one for summer– are calcu-
lated for each grid-cell using data from 1951 to 1980 only. The plus two- and plus
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three sigma-events of the reference climatology for summer are then defined as ex-
treme heat event. Extreme cold events are defined correspondingly as the minus two-
and minus three sigma-events of the reference climatology for winter. This is done for
each grid-cell. Subsequently, these measures are used to define cold spells and heat
waves for the entire data-set ranging from 1950 to 2014, summed up to the national
level after being weighted by population-density (GEOSTAT 2011 V2, Eurostat and
EFGS, 2015), and accumulated per month. Excess mortality is then regressed against
the extreme temperature measure.
The future impact of climate change is assessed using forecasts on a 0.25 degree grid
cell for the last decade of this century under two scenarios from 21 different climate
models. The forecast data are taken from the NEX-GDDP climate scenarios, which
are provided by the NASA Center for Climate Simulation (Thrasher et al., 2012).
The predicted extreme temperature measures are averaged across the models to gain
a best estimate for each scenario. To take account for demographic changes, the esti-
mates for current excess deaths are regressed against age- and sex-specific mortality
rates using data from Eurostat (2015). The estimates for the future impact of extreme
temperatures are then modified accordingly using demography forecasts from the UN
World Population Prospects (United Nations, Department of Economics, 2015).
2.3 Results
Extreme Temperature Events and Health
There is a great degree of variability in extreme temperature events and the
associated excess mortality across and within the countries of Europe. Generally,
the countries in Europe’s South –such as Spain, Italy, and Greece– are affected
greatly by frequent exposure to heat waves. In contrast, the Scandinavian countries
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–in particular Norway and Sweden– face a higher degree of excess mortality due to
cold spells. This heterogeneity is compounded by the varying impact of extreme
temperature events as shown in table A-2 in the appendix. Some countries such as
Spain and Greece experience a higher spike in mortality during a heat wave than
other countries such as Germany and Switzerland. The same holds true for cold
spell-related mortality. Countries such as Estonia are more vulnerable than other
countries such as Norway. The reasons for this are based in the differences in the
underlying socio-economic factors of the respective countries.
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Figure 2.1: Total share of excess mortality caused by temperature extremes
in Europe between 1951 and 2014. Excess mortality is expressed in % of the
national mortality rates.
Combing the effect of heat waves and cold spells, as is done in figure 2.1, leads to the
result that up to 1.78% –in case of Spain– of all mortality is excess mortality caused
by extreme temperature events. This means that an average of 0.80% of all mortality
and thus a total of over 36,100 deaths per year in the examined European countries
during the period of 1951 to 2014 are due to heat waves and cold spells. To put this
into context – the number of deaths due to traffic accidents is at a comparable level
(Eurostat, 2015).
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The Current Temperature Distribution
In more recent decades, the impact of temperature extremes has increased as the
climate has already changed significantly. Events that are as cold as the coldest 1%
temperature events of the 1951 – 1980 reference climatology were about eleven times
less likely to occur during the last decade from 2001 to 2010. In contrast, events
that are as hot as the hottest 1% temperature events of the 1951 – 1980 baseline
climatology were about nine times as frequent during the same period. Figure I-1 in
the introduction illustrates this shift in the temperature distribution.
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Figure 2.2: Additional degree of extreme temperature-caused excess mor-
tality in Europe during the decade of 2001 – 2010. Additional degree of excess
mortality is compared to the 1951 – 1980 baseline climatology and expressed in % of
the national mortality rates.
The most significantly affected countries of this shift are those in Southern Europe,
in particular Spain and Italy: They are subject to additional excess mortality of up
to 1.14% of their total mortality. These countries were already affected severely by
heat waves in the past; the reduction in cold spells is not of sufficient magnitude to
compensate for the increase in temperature. In contrast, some countries profit from
the shift. France and parts of the Balkans have not yet seen a drastic increase in
heat waves, though they have profited from a decreased occurrence of cold spells,
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leading to a net-reduction in mortality. For most other European states –as figure 2.2
shows– current levels of climate change have not had a noticeable impact on net
excess mortality. However, the overall impact of this shift is negative with an increase
of 0.35% of mortality. The yearly total number of excess deaths due to heat events
increased by around 25,600, while the yearly total number of excess deaths due to
cold spells decreased by about 8,600. This means that climate change already claims
over 17,000 lives per year in Europe.
Impacts of a Changing Climate
A further changing climate can affect this picture though. There is a high degree
of uncertainty associated with respect to the level of global warming in the future
(IPCC, 2014a). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is an
authoritative body on climate change research, uses several different climate models
to explore the extent of climate change under different scenarios. In its fifth and
latest assessment report, 21 models and four scenarios, representative concentration
pathways or RCPs, were used. Each of the RCPs assumes a different pathway for
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
In this work, two of these scenarios –RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5– are analyzed using all
21 climate models. The basis of RCP 4.5 is that emissions are stabilized and that
the level of additional radiative forcing relative to pre-industrial levels is limited to
4.5 Wm2 as well as not increasing beyond 2100. This can be considered a scenario
of moderate warming in which climate policy is successfully mitigating most effects
of global warming. In contrast, RCP 8.5 is a pessimistic scenario of severe warming,
assuming that climate politics is failing and that the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere will rise beyond 2100, causing additional radiative forcing
of over 8.5 Wm2. Further underlying assumptions for this scenario include rapid
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population growth as well as very limited gains in terms of efficiency. Hence, this
scenario assumes a drastically rising energy demand, which is increasingly satisfied
with coal (Riahi et al., 2011). It is fair to say that this scenario is somewhat unlikely.
Even though RCP 8.5 was not originally developed as a boundary condition for
climate change (van Vuuren et al., 2011), the estimates of climate change impact
–that are derived using it– can be treated as extreme upper bound estimates.
Currently, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have led to an increase of
radiative forcing of about 2.0 Wm2 (IPCC, 2014a); it is not unreasonable to assume
that the actual rise in temperature will fall somewhere between the two scenarios.
Figure 2.3 and figure 2.4 explore both scenarios and show the estimated future level
of excess mortality due to additional temperature extremes under each. Results can
also be found in table A-3.
47
Figure 2.3: Estimated future climate change-caused excess mortality in Eu-
rope in 2091 – 2100. Additional excess mortality is expressed in % of the forecasted
national mortality rates. It is calculated for the decade of 2091 – 2100 as compared to
the 1951 – 1980 baseline climatology assuming a moderate change in climate under
RCP 4.5. The triangles express uncertainty across the forecasts – the smaller the
triangles, the higher the uncertainty.
Assuming moderate warming, as is depicted in figure 2.3, some European countries
can be considered beneficiaries with a decrease in mortality of up to 1.0%. Parts of
Northern and Western Europe, particularly France, the Benelux states Belgium and
Netherlands, as well as the Scandinavian countries Norway and Sweden, will profit
from a further reduction of cold spells. In contrast, countries in Southern Europe
–mainly Spain, Greece, and Italy– will experience a considerable net-increase in
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mortality up to 3.7% due to more frequent heat waves. The average increase in
mortality across all 27 countries is 0.5%. This result suggests that there will be
winners and losers in case of moderate climate change – in order to avoid starkly
diverging pathways of excess mortality, the beneficiaries should help the negatively
affected countries with the needed adaptation measures.
Figure 2.4: Estimated future climate change-caused excess mortality in Eu-
rope in 2091 – 2100. Additional excess mortality is expressed in % of the forecasted
national mortality rates. It is calculated for the decade of 2091 – 2100 as compared to
the 1951 – 1980 baseline climatology assuming a strong change in climate under RCP
8.5. The triangles express uncertainty across the forecasts – the smaller the triangles,
the higher the uncertainty.
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Assuming severe climate change, as shown in figure 2.4, there will not be any win-
ners. Countries such as France, that could profit from a stark reduction of cold spells
concurrent with only a slight increase in heat waves under a scenario of moderate
warming, will not able to profit more from a continuing reduction of extreme cold
events; they will be subject to a greater increase in heat waves. In particular Mediter-
ranean Europe –as a subtropical region– will be affected severely with a high number
of additional excess deaths. Overall, the average mortality increase is 3.6% under
severe warming with a range from 0.6% to 15.9%.
2.4 Discussion
The projected increase in excess deaths is considerable, yet it is not the result of
the shift in temperature alone. On the contrary, this particular development is a
combination of climate change and of the European population aging. Projections
(United Nations, Department of Economics, 2015) indicate that the share of people
aged 50 years or older is increasing in all of the countries that are examined in this
work; almost all of the heat-related deaths fall into this age group, with the effect being
about 35% higher among women than among men. As a result, an aging population
winds up in a higher number of excess deaths even without a further shift in the
frequency of extreme temperature events, as the net effect of individual heat waves is
effectively increasing. This effect has consequences when thinking about appropriate
steps for climate policies even though all forecasts are based on hypothetical scenarios
that compound the uncertainties involved and limit the precision of the resulting
policy-recommendations (Weitzman, 2011). While the actual outcome might look
different, the conclusions drawn are nevertheless important to shape current and
future climate polices (McMichael et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011).
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Robustness
The impact of extreme temperature events on human mortality can also be estimated
using two other approaches that address the seasonal variation in mortality rates.
One is a fixed effects model using month- and year-fixed effects; the other is
a frequency domain model using a combination of sine and cosine functions in
conjunction with an ideal band filter. Since singular systems analysis would use sine
and cosine functions as its orthogonal signal components if this would be optimal,
there is no reason to assume that the frequency domain model would outperform it.
Given that the fixed effects models operates strictly in the time domain and not in
the frequency domain, the same argument cannot be made here. Both akaike and
bayesian information criterions as well as leave-one-out cross validation indicate that
the identification strategy using singular systems analysis performs –on average–
better than the approach using a fixed effects model. This confirms the results from
chapter 1 and shows that the approach presented also provides better results under
more complex specifications. Details are provided in tables A-4, A-5, and A-6 in the
appendix.
Robine et al. (2008) provide estimates of excess deaths for parts of Europe during
a heatwave in 2003. A total of nine countries of their analysis overlap with the
analysis presented here. This can be used to evaluate the actual performance of the
macro-level approach. The following table 2.1 compares the hospital level results of
Robine et al. (2008) with the estimates from this chapter.
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month excess deaths during summer 2003






Table 2.1: Heat-caused month-by-month excess mortality during Summer
2003 in Europe. The approach using singular systems analysis is the described in
depth in the first chapter; Robine et al. (2008) use hospital-level data.
As can be seen, the estimates derived from the approach using spectrum systems
analysis are very close to the actual numbers except for the month of September.
A country-by-country comparison can be found in the appendix in table A-1. Note
further that the estimates of heat-caused deaths here are closer to the actual numbers
than in chapter 1 of this dissertation. The reason for this is that the first chapter does
not differentiate heat waves based on their intensity, while this second chapter does.
When looking at the underlying climate data, the heat in Europe was the most intense
during August, but not very intense during September. This is also indicated by the
estimates of excess deaths of the macro level model. The gap between the macro level
estimates and the numbers by Robine et al. (2008) thus suggests that the latter is
overestimating the impact of heat waves on mortality.
Implications for Climate Change Mitigation
Leaving climate change unchecked will increase excess mortality substantially by the
end of the century. This will have a substantive effect on the economy. Following the
best practices for valuing a statistical life (OECD, 2012), the average current yearly
economic damage of extreme temperature events is about 0.8% (±0.4%) of total GDP
across the 27 surveyed countries. Investing in climate change mitigation would not
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only reduce the future costs associated with this loss of life, but also allow to reap
co-benefits from the simultaneous reduction of greenhouse gases and other pollution
(K. R. Smith and Haigler, 2008), particularly if the transportation sector is targeted
(Younger, Morrow-Almeida, Vindigni, and Dannenberg, 2008). This strategy would
also alleviate the pressure for adaptation that the Mediterranean countries will face
in the future under any scenario of climate change.
Implications for Climate Change Adaptation
For some countries, adaptation to the impacts of heat waves will be an important
–irrespective of the specific level of climate change– as heat waves will become more
frequent and more intense. Adaptation can take place either through physiological
change due to exposure, behavioral change, or physical changes. Behavioral adjust-
ments to extreme temperatures have been found (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014) and
could potentially assume many shapes. Further evidence suggests that the mecha-
nism of physical change –such as via the use of air conditioning units– is important
as well (Barreca et al., 2016). Air conditioning reduces the vulnerability to extreme
heat (Bouchama and Knochel, 2002; Reid et al., 2009) and might become even more
important with increasing urbanization (Luber and McGeehin, 2008), yet it is not
widely used in many European countries (Pezzutto et al., 2016). Overall, the avail-
able data on adaptation are limited, rendering the analysis of its impact difficult
(Deschenes, 2014). Nevertheless, studies have shown that at least some adaptation
has already taken place, yet not to the highest possible degree (Barreca et al., 2015).
This remaining potential for adaptation suggests that this paper’s forecasts of excess
mortality are upper bound estimates as some additional level of adaptation can be
expected in the future.
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Conclusions
Episodes of extreme temperatures are a major driver of human mortality in Eu-
rope, particularly for people aged 50 and above. Countries are not affected uniformly
— in future, with a changing climate, the challenges that individual countries face
will diverge tremendously: Scandinavia and some parts of Eastern Europe will not
experience a tremendous increase in heat-related mortality even under a scenario
of severe global warming. In contrast, the nations bordering the Mediterranean sea
–particularly Greece, Italy, and Spain– will be negatively affected already early on
under moderate climate change. This means that a roadmap for climate change adap-
tation in Europe should target these vulnerable states early on in order to prevent
unnecessary excess deaths..
In addition to adaptation, mitigation remains an important part for European cli-
mate policy. If it is feasible to contain the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
within the RCP 4.5-scenario, the large majority of European countries will not be
negatively affected by the change in the local climatology; in contrast, some countries
could even benefit from drastically reduced cold spell-related mortality.
In conclusion, this means that the loading of the climate dice does not inevitably
mean a threat to public health in form of an increase of net mortality. However,
excess loading does pose a tremendous danger and should accordingly be avoided.
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Chapter 3
Explicit Communication of Uncertainty: Increasing
Cooperation in Climate Policy
Failure in international coordination on climate change mitigation policies can pos-
sibly result in high losses due to a sudden shift in climate-sensitive environmental
systems. The uncertainty associated with these potential losses is usually only ad-
dressed implicitly when discussing the costs and benefits of climate change policies
using the usual expected utility framework. However, explicit communication might
increase cooperation across political actors.
Here, I analyze this subject experimentally. Using equivalent common pool games,
the difference between masking uncertainty behind an expected utility framework and
making it explicit is explored.
The experiment shows that communication of uncertainty matters. The average level
of contribution in a common pool game increases significantly when uncertainty is
communicated, increasing average returns. This finding suggests that climate change
mitigation strategies could increase adoption if the uncertainty associated with cli-
mate change is made explicit.
3.1 Motivation
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time: Countries need to coop-
erate and to reduce global CO2-emissions. As is the case in social dilemma situations,
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cooperation and mutual abatement are hard to reach given that collective interests
do not align with private interests — accordingly, so far, no effective climate policy
regime has been created. In contrast, instead of working towards the Pareto-optimal
situation of mutual climate change mitigation, some countries start to focus on the
adoption of –individually rational– climate change adaptation measures.
Due to its nature, climate change poses a slightly different case than other social
dilemma situations: The negative effects of climate change do not necessarily take
place incrementally. Scientific evidence (Clark, Pisias, Stocker, and Weaver, 2002;
Dakos et al., 2008; Lenton et al., 2008) suggests that abrupt changes with catastrophic
consequences can occur – and have occurred – after reaching a certain, currently un-
known, threshold in the atmospheric CO2-level. This results in a damage function
that is characterized by high-impact, low-probability events (Weitzman, 2009, 2011).
This should make the possibility of abrupt climate change a focal point for policy
makers (Alley et al., 2003) and thus also of those who study the emergence of inter-
national climate governance.
Notwithstanding this, the costs of climate change tend to be presented to policy mak-
ers without explicit acknowledgement of this possibility, but rather using expected
values (see e.g. Fankhauser, 1994). An early example of this is DICE (Dynamic In-
tegrated model of Climate and the Economy). This is one of the most prominent
integrated assessment models on climate change policies, developed by Nordhaus
(1994). While Nordhaus devotes a lot of attention to the issue of uncertainty when
discussing his model, uncertainty is not made explicit in the output of the model.
Generally, there is a high degree of variance in estimates across models (Tol, 2005),
though the individual models do not necessarily acknowledge this.
It is no surprise that this the situation is comparable when it comes to policy reports.
While the 2017 Economic Report of the President acknowledges the importance of
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possible climate catastrophes, it fails to actually discuss them and instead relies on
expected costs (Economic Report of the President, 2017).
Another example for this can be found in the executive summary of the Stern re-
port. In this work –arguably the most influential economic analysis of the costs of
climate change to date– Stern chooses to present his results within an expected utility
framework:
Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates
that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever.
If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates
of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more. (Stern, 2006, p. vi)
Similarly, the latest IPPCC chooses to identify key risks based on both probability
and impact:
Risk is often represented as the probability of occurrence of hazardous
events or trends multiplied by the magnitude of the consequences if these
events occur. Therefore, high risk can result not only from high proba-
bility outcomes but also from low probability outcomes with very severe
consequences. (IPCC, 2014c, p. 36)
When presenting and summarizing key risks in its synthesis report, it does not differ-
entiate between low-impact, high-probability and high-impact, low probability events
(see IPCC, 2014c, p. 65, fig. 2.4), thus implicitly assuming that both types of risk are
to be treated in the same manner.
The question is whether or not a more differentiated way of communicating the un-
certainty of climate change impacts would lead to a more cooperative reaction from
policy makers. Given the nature of climate change –with its major impacts expected
in the distant future– a natural experiment might not be the way to find an answer.
This makes the case for a laboratory experiment.
Behavioral economics in general might play an important role when it comes to
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communicating and designing climate change policies (see e.g. Gowdy, 2008) as well
as managing common pool resources (Ostrom, 2006). Particularly laboratory experi-
ments allow controlled variation and thus causal inference (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
Some experimental approaches have included catastrophic thresholds in contribu-
tion games (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012; Barrett, 2013; Barrett and Dannenberg,
2014b; Dannenberg, Lo¨schel, Paolacci, Reif, and Tavoni, 2015), focusing on impact
and threshold uncertainty. Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) compare gradual with
abrupt climate change in a one-shot contribution game and find that contributions
are higher in case of abrupt climate change.
Here, something similar is done using symmetric contribution games. The first game
is based on the standard expected utility framework, while the second includes a de-
gree of uncertainty. In contrast to the work by Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a) where
the noncooperative outcome is not hold constant across treatments, both treatments
here are equivalent in expectation. The experiment is thus both a complement and
an extension to existing literature and therefore a potentially important contribution
to both economic theory and global environmental governance.
While the focus of this experimental paper is catastrophic climate risk, the conclu-
sions drawn from it can be used for similar social dilemma situations. As Scheffer,
Carpenter, Foley, Folke, and Walker (2001) suggest, a variety of ecosystems such as
coral reefs, woodlands, and deserts might react with sudden shifts when exposed to
gradual change in environmental parameters. Rockstro¨m et al. (2009) link a change
in key environmental variables to many of these shifts.
Knowledge about the effects of risk communication on cooperation might thus be




The experiment is based on two single-shot public goods games using groups of four.
One game is a standard version of the game, the other is a non-standard version, where
returns depend on meeting an unknown threshold that is determined by chance. The
first game, the standard game, represents the expected utility representation of cli-
mate change — the costs of non-cooperation are linear, there are no unknowns, and
there is no abrupt response. The second game, the uncertainty game, represents the
uncertainty representation of climate change — a high-impact event is triggered if an
unknown minimum level of cooperation is not met.
The expected payoffs in both treatments are the same. There is a single Nash equi-
librium — to contribute zero to the public good. Players should hence contribute
the same amount, that is zero. This forms the null and alternative hypotheses: If
communicating the possible catastrophes matters, there should be a higher level of
cooperation in the uncertainty treatment than in the standard game. One possible
explanation is standard risk aversion, which is extensively discussed by Rabin and
Thaler (2001). In the uncertainty game, participants that are risk averse, need to
make a trade-off between maximizing their earnings and minimizing the potential
risk from the catastrophe within their objective function. Hence, risk averse partic-
ipants should contribute more in the uncertainty version of the game than in the
standard version.
In the laboratory experiment, participants are drawn from the student body of
Columbia University (using the recruitment-software ORSEE, see Greiner, 2015) and
interact with each other using computer terminals (programmed with the software
zTree, see Fischbacher, 2007). Each participant plays both treatments 20 times each,
with random rematching of participants between each round. Some participants play
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the standard version first, while others play the uncertainty version first. This al-
lows to control for treatment order effects and to increase the statistical power, thus
combining the benefits of a between- with the benefits of a within-subjects design
following Charness, Gneezy, and Kuhn (2012). In addition to the two common pool
games, participants play a risk elicitation game using the multiple price list method
following Holt and Laury (2002) (see appendix, table A-7). Finally, A survey at the
end of the experiment (see appendix, table A-8) allows to draw more inferences about
the impact of socio-economic factors as well as about the participants’ motivations.
Expected Utility Representation
The standard game –the expected utility representation of climate change– is a single-
shot public goods game played with groups of four. The budget per participant is ten
token. The full budget can be invested towards the common pool. After everyone has
decided on the level of their contribution, qi, participants receive 0.5 token per token
in the pool. In addition, participants can keep the remaining token in their budget.
The payoff-function for individual i looks as follows:




q ∈ {0, . . . , 10}
If nobody contributes to the common pool, the individual payoff is 10 token; if every-
body contributes the maximum, the individual payoff is twenty token. Accordingly,
the social optimum is to contribute the maximum amount of token, whereas the
unique Nash equilibrium is to not contribute at all.
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Uncertainty Representation
The second treatment –the uncertainty representation of climate change– is also
single-shot public goods game played with groups of four. The budget per partic-
ipant is thirty token. Up to ten token can be invested towards the common pool.
Participants can keep the remaining token from their budget. Here, participants do
not receive returns on the pool — contributions to the pool reduce the risk of a catas-
trophe. If the catastrophe happens, all participants suffer a loss of twenty token. The
chance of this happening is 0% if all four group members invest the maximum of ten
token each. It is 100% if the total group contribution is zero and changes linearly in
between. The function for expected payoffs of individual i looks as follows:
Epii = 30− qi − P (C) · 20






q ∈ {0, . . . , 10}
Again, as in the first treatment, if nobody contributes to the common pool, the in-
dividual payoff is 10 token; if everybody contributes the maximum, the individual
payoff is twenty token.
This means that the payoffs for both the non-cooperative as well as the full cooper-
ative outcome are held the same across both treatments. Accordingly, the dominant
strategy for a player –no contribution to the pool– is also the same in either treat-
ment. Further, as both games have the same constant marginal per capita returns,
differences in behavior across games are not expected.
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3.3 Results
The experiment was conducted in six sessions with a total of 100 participants. In
three sessions with 52 participants the expected utility version of the treatment was
played before the uncertainty version; in three other sessions with 48 participants,
the treatment order was reversed.
Impact on Contributions to the Common Pool
While both treatments are equivalent in expectation, the behavior that participants
showed in the uncertainty game was in stark contrast to their behavior in the standard
game (p < 0.01).
treatment mean group contribution modal group contribution range of group contribution
standard game 12.1 10 0 – 40
uncertainty game 24.0 20 5 – 38
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of experimental results. Mean and modal group
contributions are provided for each treatment as well as the range of group contribu-
tions.
On average, the difference in the average individual contribution is 2.97 higher in the
uncertainty representation than in the expected utility representation. That means,
with an average individual contribution of 3.03 in the standard game, the contribu-
tions in the uncertainty game are over 98% higher. In terms of group behavior, this
translates into higher average group contributions and thus also higher individual





















Figure 3.1: Average individual contribution by treatment and round. The
plot shows the average individual contribution with the 95% confidence interval for
both the standard game and the uncertainty variation of the game for each round.
With each round, the difference between the average individual contribution in each
treatment increases. In the expected utility framework, the average individual con-
tribution decreases on average by 0.20 in each round, whereas the decline in the
uncertainty treatment is barely noticeable with only 0.06, that is less than one third
of the decline of the standard game.
For later rounds of the expected utility game, the average contribution converges to
zero, that is towards the dominant strategy. In contrast, the level of individual con-
tributions in the uncertainty representation stays comparatively high.
When only looking at the second half of each treatment, that is when only consid-
ering round 11 to 20, the difference between the two treatment becomes even more
apparent. There, the average individual contribution in the standard game decreases
on average by 0.17 in each round, whereas the average contribution in the uncertainty
game remains constant around 5.71. This result is insofar interesting as contributions
towards a common pool usually tend to decrease over time in an experimental setting.
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This indicates that the uncertainty representation leads the participants towards an
attractor approximately at the middle between social optimum and Nash equilibrium.
This behavior in the uncertainty game is consistent irrespective of treatment order.
Further, this also means that participants are not confused about the game or its
solution as their behavior does not change over time.
Treatment Order Effects
Treatment order does not explain the observed difference as it persists when
disaggregating the experimental data based on which treatment was played first.
As figure 3.2 shows, the difference between the standard game and the uncer-
tainty game remains. The difference between the average level of contribution
increases in both cases with the number of periods. On average it is 3.08 when
the respective treatment is being played first, and it is 2.86 when the respective
treatment is being played second. There is no significant difference in the level of
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Figure 3.2: Average individual contribution by treatment, treatment order,
and round. The first plot shows the average individual contribution with the 95%
confidence interval for both the standard game and the uncertainty game being played
first, the second plot shows the average individual contribution with the 95% confi-
dence interval for both the standard game and the uncertainty variation of the game
being played second.
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When the standard game is being played first, the average individual contribution
decreases by 0.21 per round — when it is being played second, the decrease is 0.18.
This trend is very similar when only looking at rounds 11 to 20. There, with the
standard game being played first, the decrease is 0.15 and, with the standard game
being played second, 0.20. The situation looks very different for the uncertainty game.
When this game is being played first, this decrease is 0.05; when it is being played
second, it is 0.08. When only looking at rounds 11 to 20, there is not significant
change in the average individual contribution.
Further results
Experiencing a loss in the uncertainty game has an impact on the following average
individual contribution (0.45, p < 0.01). The effect size is too small to explain the
differences in average contribution between the standard game and the uncertainty
game, especially since the loss was only experienced in about 30% of all rounds and
as there is already a difference in behavior from the first round on.
Neither stated nor revealed risk preferences have a significant impact on the level
of contribution in either treatment. This means that risk averse individuals do not
contribute more than risk loving individuals and that the difference in average con-
tribution across treatments cannot be explained with risk aversion of the individual.
Calculating the constant relative risk aversion revealed through the difference in con-
tribution across the two treatments for each individual, substantiates this finding
further. Comparing it to the results from the multiple price list method, indicates
that 89 participants should have contributed less in the uncertainty game than they
actually did. In contrast, only five participants contributed more than they were ex-
pected based on their level of risk aversion. For six participants, the analysis was
inconclusive as they did not behave rational in the risk elicitation game. Keeping this
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result in mind, 92% of the participants stated that their willingness to accept risks
was at least somewhat important in determining their level of contribution.
When it comes to fairness, the results are similar. It did also not play a decisive role,
but 77% of participants considered fairness an at least somewhat important issue in
the experiment.
There is no indication that age, gender, major, or other socio-economic factors played
a decisive role. After the experiment, 60% of the participants indicated that they
preferred the uncertainty game, while 32% preferred the standard game. As average
earnings for the uncertainty game were higher than for the standard game, this makes
intuitive sense.
3.4 Discussion
The results demonstrate that the representation of uncertainty matters when it comes
to individual contributions towards a common good. Making uncertainty explicit
makes cooperation more obtainable. This finding is not the result of risk aversion,
which is consistent with Barrett and Dannenberg (2014a), who also find that risk
aversion does not influence the level of contribution.
Perception of Others’ Likelihood to Contribute
As risk aversion does not play a role for the increased level of contribution in the
uncertainty representation when compared to the expected utility representation,
there has to be a different explanation. One possible reason is that –while individual
risk aversion does not matter– expectations about others’ behavior does. Participants
might be guided by a preference for fairness and might try to avoid unequal outcomes.
Comments by participants that were collected with a questionnaire (see appendix,
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table A-8) after the experiment support this hypothesis and indicate that participants
thought that others would be more willing to contribute when facing uncertainty:
[I contributed more b]ecause it’s likely that the [uncertainty game] makes
people want to collaborate.
I felt more inclined to contribute greater amounts [in the uncertainty
game] and I know others did as well.
[There was] more incentive to cooperate [in the uncertainty game].
It seemed like the risk of failure [in the uncertainty game] incentivized
greater cooperation.
People [contributed] more because there was more at stake for them [in
the uncertainty game].
It thus seems as if participants make rather assumptions about others and adjust their
own behavior accordingly. Results that are similar to this, though not related to public
goods games, are discussed by Goeree and Holt (2001). Another possible explanation
might be inequity aversion (see Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt, 2006). Participants expect
other participants to contribute more in the uncertainty game than in the standard
game and thus contribute more themselves.
Interestingly enough, some participants preferred the standard game, arguing to have
more control over their own payoff that way:
I didn’t have to worry as much about the other participants [in the stan-
dard game].
I have much more control [in the standard game].
[The uncertainty game] relied heavily on the actions of others for success,
thus making it more unpredictable.
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There is no significant difference in behavior between the participants that prefer the
standard game to those that prefer the uncertainty game when playing the uncer-
tainty game. On the other hand, on average, participants that prefer the standard
game contribute less (p < 0.01) than those that prefer the uncertainty game when
playing the standard game. This result suggests that the uncertainty representation
can support a positive level of cooperation, irrespective of the type of participants
involved.
One open question –that this study is not able to address– is the question, whether
group size has an noticeable and meaningful impact on this effect. It is conceivable,
that individuals perceive a decreasing likelihood of others to contribute with increas-
ing size. Literature finds that this is not the case if the increase in group size does not
go along with a decrease in marginal returns from contributing (Isaac and Walker,
103). In contrast, group size might even be beneficial (Isaac, Walker, and Williams,
1994), at least if the marginal returns from contributing are rather low (Nosenzo,
Quercia, and Sefton, 2015). The caveat here is, that group size might have a different
effect on the uncertainty representation than on the expected utility representation.
Thus, more research on the topic is needed.
Conclusions
Taken together, the experimental results make the case for a paradigm shift in com-
municating the uncertainties associated with climate change and climate mitigation
policies. By making the uncertainty evident, individuals are nudged to make new
assumptions about each others’ behavior and voluntarily adjust their own behavior
accordingly. The result is more cooperation, higher individual returns, and a move
towards the social optimum.
This result is of significance for the creation of international climate policy regimes.
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It suggests that uncertainty should be discussed in executive summaries and that it
is not sufficient to hide it behind the single number that is expected costs.
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Conclusion
This work deals with different aspects of the economics of climate change in three
essays. The first essay discusses the possibility to use data of low spatial and temporal
resolution to estimate the impact of heat waves on human mortality. The second essay
uses the methodology developed in the first essay to assess the impact of temperature
extremes on mortality rates in Europe under two climate change scenarios. The last
essay explores how uncertainty –such as about the impact of temperature extremes–
needs to be framed in order to promote cooperation.
Three main results can be drawn from this work: First, singular spectrum analysis
is a valid tool that can be used to gain sufficient information on excess mortality in
order to make plausible inferences on the effects of extreme temperature events on
human mortality. As a result, the analysis of climate change impacts on public health
can be extended to geographic areas where no detailed health data are available.
Thus, a more comprehensive idea of the impacts of climate change can be gained.
Second, climate change impacts are not uniform and can –under certain scenarios–
produce winners and losers. More specifically speaking, climate change –if contained
to a small rise in average temperatures– can have a negative net impact on mortality
in some European countries due to a decrease in cold spells. In contrast, unrestricted
climate change can lead to a large increase in net mortality across all examined coun-
tries as a result of increasingly frequent heat waves. This means that –from a public
health perspective for Europe– climate change should be mitigated to some degree.
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Third, uncertainty associated with climate change impacts needs to be communicated
explicitly if the goal is to increase international cooperation on climate change mit-
igation policies. Social dilemma situations are perceived differently when discussing
uncertainty openly rather than using an expected utility framework. This means that
uncertainty needs to be featured more prominently in the executive summaries of
assessment reports on climate change impacts.
These results are important for two major reasons. For one, extending the analysis
of climate change impacts beyond those countries for which there are very detailed
data, allows to improve our understanding of the heterogeneity in impacts as well as
to gain more knowledge about the interaction between impact and socio-economic
context. In turn, this makes it possible to design better adaptation policies and to
direct funds towards the regions that will be affected the most. For another, enrich-
ing pure game theory with insights from laboratory experiments –thus considering
behavioral effects– allows for far better, much more effective design of climate change
mitigation treaties.
While this work primarily focuses on the health impacts of climate change as well as
on how to deal with the associated uncertainty, it has wider implications; some of the
conclusions drawn can be applied to other challenges of sustainable development. On
the one hand, there is a lack of detailed data for many countries. At least when it
comes to phenomena that are subject to cyclic fluctuations –such as weather patterns
and certain vector-born diseases– singular spectrum analysis can be a helpful comple-
ment to other approaches. While not a replacement for analyses based on micro-level
data, it can guide and inform policy decisions until better data are available. On
the other hand, environmental policies often face a high degree of uncertainty due
to he complex nature of human-environment systems. Here, when different parties
are needed to cooperate, the communication of uncertainty matters. Thus, explicit
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communication of uncertainty can help to implement environmental policies other
than those targeting at climate change mitigation.
In conclusion, there are many open questions on economics of climate change. Some
of them are explored in the context of this work. The gained results help complement
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Table A-1: Heat-caused country-by-country excess mortality during Sum-
mer 2003 in Europe. The approach using singular systems analysis is the described
in depth in the main body of the first chapter; Robine et al. (2008) use hospital-level
data.
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country data length (years) -3σ -2σ +2σ +3σ
Austria 54 0.03 0.01 * 0.01 *** -0.10
Belgium 39 0.00 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01
Bulgaria 20 0.14 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.01
Croatia 22 -0.59 ** 0.04 ** 0.01 *** -0.06
Czech Republic 19 -0.11 0.00 0.01 *** - 0.06
Denmark 54 0.04 0.00 0.01 *** 0.03
Estonia 39 -0.26 ** 0.08 *** 0.04 *** -0.04
Finland 54 0.01 ** 0.00 0.02 *** -2.02
France 19 0.15 ** 0.02 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 ***
Germany 23 0.01 0.01 0.01 *** 0.04
Greece 54 0.00 0.02 *** 0.07 *** -0.09
Hungary 20 0.01 0.01 *** 0.11 *
Italy 54 -0.05 0.03 *** 0.03 *** -0.35
Latvia 18 0.04 * 0.01 0.01 ***
Lithuania 20 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 *** -0.45
Macedonia 19 -2.42 0.02 ** 0.01 *** -0.03
Netherlands 24 0.04 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.01
Norway 54 0.00 0.01 *** 0.01 *** -0.06
Poland 19 -0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.37
Portugal 54 -0.22 0.09 *** 0.02 *** 0.10 ***
Romania 19 -0.43 0.03 ** 0.01 ** -0.02
Slovakia 18 0.05 0.01 0.01 *** 0.00
Slovenia 18 -0.23 0.01 0.01 *** -0.02
Spain 39 -0.26 ** 0.08 *** 0.04 *** -0.04
Sweden 54 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 *** 0.01
Switzerland 54 0.00 0.01 * 0.01 *** 0.00
United Kingdom 32 0.01 0.01 0.01 *** -0.01
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A-2: Regression coefficients of extreme temperature measures. Regres-
sion coefficients represent the increase in monthly mortality rates for each extreme
temperature event.
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country excess mortality (% of total mortality)
(RCP 4.5) (RCP 8.5)
Austria 0.63 (± 0.52) 2.59 (± 0.99)
Belgium -0.02 (± 0.34) 1.08 (± 0.78)
Bulgaria 0.29 (± 0.93) 2.71 (± 1.55)
Croatia 0.59 (± 0.55) 2.52 (± 1.02)
Czech Republic 0.31 (± 0.36) 1.48 (± 0.65)
Denmark 0.27 (± 0.30) 1.07 (± 0.75)
Estonia 0.02 (± 0.21) 0.74 (± 0.68)
Finland 0.22 (± 0.49) 1.73 (± 1.70)
France -0.30 (± 0.83) 4.53 (± 3.78)
Germany 0.25 (± 0.37) 1.61 (± 0.80)
Greece 3.75 (± 3.37) 15.86 (± 7.78)
Hungary 0.64 (± 0.40) 1.92 (± 0.68)
Italy 1.81 (± 1.52) 7.78 (± 3.38)
Latvia 0.22 (± 0.24) 1.15 (± 0.78)
Lithuania 0.04 (± 0.36) 1.36 (± 1.00)
Macedonia 0.81 (± 0.84) 2.77 (± 1.16)
Netherlands -0.28 (± 0.31) 1.01 (± 0.98)
Norway -0.28 (± 0.37) 0.60 (± 0.92)
Poland 0.10 (± 0.39) 1.37 (± 0.79)
Portugal -1.01 (± 0.38) 2.44 (± 3.26)
Romania 0.01 (± 0.41) 1.23 (± 0.68)
Slovakia 0.50 (± 0.42) 1.82 (± 0.71)
Slovenia 0.60 (± 0.34) 1.83 (± 0.64)
Spain 2.63 (± 2.47) 11.28 (± 5.29)
Sweden -0.16 (± 0.25) 0.79 (± 0.91)
Switzerland 0.39 (± 0.40) 1.90 (± 0.77)
United Kingdom 0.24 (± 0.32) 1.30 (± 0.85)
Table A-3: Estimated future climate change-caused excess mortality in Eu-
rope in 2091 – 2100. Additional excess mortality is expressed in % of the forecasted
national mortality rates. It is calculated for the decade of 2091 – 2100 as compared to
the 1951 – 1980 baseline climatology assuming either moderate warming under RCP
4.5 or severe warming under RCP 8.5.
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country akaike information criterion



























United Kingdom -1,038 -684
Table A-4: Performance comparison of two different identification strategies
using akaike information criterion. The approach using singular systems analysis
is the described in depth in the main body of chapter 1; the fixed effects model uses
year- and month-fixed effects.
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country bayes information criterion



























United Kingdom -1,014 -617
Table A-5: Performance comparison of two different identification strategies
using bayes information criterion. The approach using singular systems analysis
is the described in depth in the main body of chapter 1; the fixed effects model uses
year- and month-fixed effects.
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country leave-one-out cross validation (root mean squared error)



























United Kingdom 0.06 0.10
Table A-6: Performance comparison of two different identification strategies
using leave-one-out cross validation. The approach using singular systems anal-
ysis is the described in depth in the main body of chapter 1; the fixed effects model
uses year- and month-fixed effects.
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Option A Option B
1/10 of $2.00 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85 9/10 of $0.10
2/10 of $2.00 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85 8/10 of $0.10
3/10 of $2.00 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85 7/10 of $0.10
4/10 of $2.00 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85 6/10 of $0.10
5/10 of $2.00 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85 5/10 of $0.10
6/10 of $2.00 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85 4/10 of $0.10
7/10 of $2.00 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85 3/10 of $0.10
8/10 of $2.00 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85 2/10 of $0.10
9/10 of $2.00 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85 1/10 of $0.10
10/10 of $2.00 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85 0/10 of $0.10
Table A-7: Risk elicitation via the multiple price list method (Holt and
Laury, 2002). Participants of the laboratory experiment were asked to indicate
whether they prefer option A or option B in each of the ten lotteries. A rational
participant is expected to choose option B in the tenth lottery. In the first lottery,
everyone but the most risk loving participants should choose option A. The level
of risk aversion is determined by the lottery for which an individual switches from
choosing option A to option B. The higher the risk aversion, the later this switch.
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Were you generally satisfied with the outcome of the first game?
Very much — Somewhat — Not at all — I prefer not to tell
Were you generally satisfied with the outcome of the second game?
Very much — Somewhat — Not at all — I prefer not to tell
Was there anything that made you play differently in the second game
than in the first? Why?
Yes — No — Unsure — Prefer not to tell / [Open question]
If you could choose which game to play, would you choose the first or the
second? Why?
First — Second — Unsure — Prefer not to tell / [Open question]
Did fairness play a role for your contribution decision?
Very much — Somewhat — Not at all — I prefer not to tell
Did your willingness to take risks play a role for your contribution deci-
sion?
Very much — Somewhat — Not at all — I prefer not to tell
What was the most important reason for your contribution?
[Open question]
In what year were you born?
[Open question]
What is your gender?
Female — Male — Other — I prefer not to tell
What is your marital status?
Married — Widowed — Divorced — Separated — Never married — I
prefer not to tell
Do you have any children?
Yes — No — I prefer not to tell
What is/was your major?
[Open question]
Do you have any final comments on your experience?
[Open question]
Table A-8: Questionnaire for laboratory experiment. Participants of the labo-
ratory experiment were asked to answer the questions, but were not required to do
so.
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